Friday, August 14, 2026

Sections 1 and 2 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023



Abstract

The Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (“BSA”) is one of the three major criminal-law reforms introduced in India to replace the colonial-era Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (“IEA”). The BSA came into force on 1 July 2024 and is intended to consolidate and provide general rules and principles of evidence for a fair trial. Section 1 establishes the operational boundaries, applicability, and commencement of the statute, whereas,  Section 2 serves as the legislative dictionary, defining the foundational vocabulary necessary to understand the entire framework of Indian evidence law.

.Sections 1 and 2 may appear introductory, but they answer two fundamental questions:

  1. Where and when does the BSA apply?
  2. What do the important expressions used throughout the BSA actually mean?

Understanding these provisions therefore makes it considerably easier to understand the rest of evidence law.

 PART I — SECTION 1 OF THE BSA, 2023

Section 1(1): Short Title

Section 1(1) provides: “This Act may be called the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023.”

Why does the short title matter?

In legal drafting and judicial decisions, legislation must be capable of being referred to conveniently and consistently. Thus, instead of repeatedly describing it as “the law relating to evidence enacted in 2023”, courts and lawyers can simply refer to the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 or BSA.

Section 1(2): Application of the BSA

Section 1(2) provides that the BSA applies to all judicial proceedings in or before any Court, including Courts-martial, but excludes:

  1. affidavits presented to any Court or officer; and
  2. proceedings before an arbitrator.

This part of Section 1 is particularly important because it establishes the functional boundary of evidence law.

“All Judicial Proceedings”:  The BSA is not intended to govern every proceeding in which somebody collects information or hears statements. Its principal field is the judicial determination of disputes and issues by courts. In simple terms: The BSA tells courts what material can be treated as evidence and how facts are to be established in judicial proceedings.

Example: Suppose A files a civil suit against B alleging that B failed to repay ₹5 lakh. During the trial, A produces:

  • the loan agreement;
  • bank records;
  • relevant messages;
  • testimony of witnesses.

The court will assess such material under the applicable law of evidence, including the BSA. However, if a person merely makes an informal complaint to a private organization, that does not automatically become a “judicial proceeding” governed by the BSA.

Application to Courts-martialSection 1 expressly includes Courts-martial. This is an important continuity with the earlier Evidence Act. The Indian Evidence Act also applied to judicial proceedings before Courts-martial, subject to the statutory framework governing the armed forces. The Army Act, 1950, for example, separately provided that the Indian Evidence Act applied to proceedings before a Court-martial, subject to the provisions of that Act. The BSA's express reference to Courts-martial therefore makes clear that evidence principles are not confined to ordinary civil and criminal courts.

Exclusion of Affidavits:  Section 1(2) specifically states that the BSA does not apply to affidavits presented to any Court or officer. This does not mean that affidavits can never have a role in litigation. Rather, the point is that an affidavit, merely because it is filed, does not automatically become evidence governed by the BSA.

The principle is consistent with the earlier law. In Smt. Sudha Devi v. M.P. Narayanan, the Supreme Court explained that affidavits are not included within the definition of evidence under the Evidence Act and could be used as evidence where the procedural law permitted it, including through an appropriate court order.

A later judicial decision under the BSA, Dilip Kumar Mishra v. Deo Kumar Mishra (Patna High Court, 2026), similarly recognized that an affidavit is not automatically evidence merely because it exists in the court record; the procedural circumstances and opportunity for cross-examination remain important.

Exclusion of Arbitration Proceedings:  Section 1(2) also excludes proceedings before an arbitrator. This distinction is important because arbitration is adjudicatory but is not the same thing as a judicial proceeding before a court. The earlier Evidence Act contained the same basic exclusion. Judicial discussion of the expression “Court” under the old legislation repeatedly recognized the distinction between courts and arbitrators. In Ramrao v. Narayan, the Supreme Court noted that the definition of “Court” under evidence legislation was specifically designed for that statute and that arbitrators were outside that definition.

Does this mean arbitrators can ignore evidence principles?

Not necessarily. The exclusion means that the BSA does not directly govern arbitration proceedings in the same way that it governs judicial proceedings. Arbitration is primarily regulated by the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, together with the applicable procedural framework and principles of natural justice.

Section 1(3): Commencement

Section 1(3) provides that the BSA shall come into force on a date appointed by the Central Government through notification in the Official Gazette. That date was subsequently notified as 1 July 2024 through Notification No. S.O. 849(E), dated 23 February 2024.

Why is commencement important?

A law may be enacted on one date but brought into operation on another.

In the case of the BSA:

  • Presidential assent: 25 December 2023
  • Commencement: 1 July 2024

This distinction is important when determining which evidentiary regime governs a particular proceeding.

PART II — SECTION 2 OF THE BSA, 2023

Section 2: Definitions

Section 2 is the definition clause of the BSA. It begins with the familiar statutory phrase: “In this Adhiniyam, unless the context otherwise requires…” Section 2(1) defines key legal terms that dictate how evidence is gathered, tested, and appreciated. Section 2(2) further clarifies that expressions not defined in the BSA - but found in sister statutes like the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), or the Information Technology Act, 2000 will carry the same meanings.

Section 2(1) (a): “Court”

The BSA provides that “Court” includes all Judges and Magistrates, and all persons, except arbitrators, legally authorized to take evidence. This is an inclusive definition. It is deliberately wider than merely saying “civil court” or “criminal court”.

In Brajnandan Sinha v. Jyoti Narain, AIR 1956 SC 66, the Supreme Court discussed the nature of a “Court” and emphasized the judicial character of the body exercising the relevant jurisdiction. The decision has continued to be important in understanding the distinction between a true court and other authorities or tribunals.

 Section 2(1) (b): “Conclusive Proof”

“Conclusive proof” represents the strongest statutory form of presumption. Where the BSA declares one fact to be conclusive proof of another, once the foundational fact is established, the court must treat the other fact as proved and cannot permit evidence to disprove it.

Example: Suppose the law says that once Fact A is legally established, Fact B must be treated as proved. The court cannot then permit a party to produce evidence merely to establish that Fact B is actually false. This is different from an ordinary presumption.

 Section 2(1) (c): “Disproved”

A fact is disproved when, after considering the material before it, the Court:

  • believes that the fact does not exist; or
  • considers its non-existence so probable that a prudent person would act on the assumption that it does not exist.

Notice that “disproved” is not merely the opposite of “proved” in a mathematical sense. The court evaluates the material as a whole.

Example: A claims that B was present in Delhi at 8 p.m. B produces reliable CCTV footage showing that B was in Mumbai at the same time, supported by travel records and other independent material. If the court accepts this material, B's presence in Delhi at that time may be treated as disproved.

Section 2(1) (d): “Document”

One of the most significant modernizations under the BSA appears in the definition of “document.” The provision covers material:

  • expressed;
  • described;
  • otherwise recorded;

upon a substance through letters, figures, marks, other means, or combinations of these, and expressly includes electronic and digital records.

The statutory illustrations include:

  • writings;
  • printed or photographed words;
  • maps and plans;
  • inscriptions on metal or stone;
  • caricatures; and
  • electronic records such as emails, server logs, computer or smartphone records, messages, websites, location evidence and voicemail stored on digital devices.

Example: Suppose A sends B an email confirming: “I agree to purchase the machinery for ₹20 lakh.” The email can fall within the statutory concept of a document. Similarly, a relevant message stored on a smartphone can qualify as a document.

Important caution: Calling something a “document” does not automatically mean that it has been proved or is admissible in every circumstance.

Electronic Evidence and Earlier Judicial Principles

The BSA's express recognition of electronic and digital records is particularly significant when viewed against earlier Supreme Court jurisprudence.

In Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473, the Supreme Court developed important principles concerning electronic records under the IEA.

The Court later revisited the subject comprehensively in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, (2020) 7 SCC 1, explaining the relationship between primary electronic evidence and the statutory requirements governing electronic records.

Section 2(1)(e): “Evidence”

Section 2(1)(e) provides that “evidence” includes two broad categories:

(i) Oral evidence - This consists of statements, including statements given electronically, which the Court permits or requires witnesses to make concerning matters of fact under inquiry.

(ii) Documentary evidence - This consists of documents, including electronic or digital records, produced for the inspection of the Court.

This is an important development because the BSA expressly recognizes statements given electronically within the definition of oral evidence.

Example: Suppose a witness is permitted by the applicable procedural law to give testimony through an electronic/audio-video mode. The statement made by that witness can fall within the statutory concept of oral evidence. On the other hand, a CCTV recording of an incident is documentary evidence in the broader statutory sense because it is an electronic record produced before the court.

A useful distinction

Witness speaks electronically → oral evidence.

Digital recording/document is produced before the Court → documentary evidence.

The distinction concerns the nature of the material, not merely whether technology is involved.

 Section 2(1)(f): “Fact”

The BSA defines a “fact” broadly. It includes:

  1. anything, state of things or relation of things capable of being perceived by the senses; and
  2. any mental condition of which a person is conscious.

Thus, facts are not restricted to physical objects.

Physical fact - “A red car was parked outside the house.” This is capable of being perceived through the senses.

Mental fact - “A intended to kill B.” The intention exists in A's mind, but it is nevertheless capable of becoming a legally relevant fact if proved through permissible evidence.

Section 2(1) (g): “Facts in Issue”

“Facts in issue” are the facts from which, independently or together with other facts, the existence, non-existence, nature or extent of a right, liability or disability asserted or denied in a proceeding necessarily follows.

In simple language: Facts in issue are the central disputed facts that the court actually has to decide.

Example:  If A is accused of murdering B, possible facts in issue include:

  • whether A caused B's death;
  • whether A intended to cause B's death;
  • whether A received grave and sudden provocation;
  • whether A was incapable of understanding the nature of the act because of unsoundness of mind.

These are not merely background facts. They go directly to the legal determination.

Facts in issue versus relevant facts

This distinction is fundamental.

Suppose A is accused of murdering B.

Fact in issue: A caused B's death.

Relevant fact: A purchased a weapon shortly before the incident. The purchase of the weapon may be relevant to the question of whether A caused the death or had the necessary intention, but it is not itself necessarily the ultimate issue that the court must determine.

 Section 2(1) (h): “May Presume”

When the BSA states that the Court may presume a fact, the Court has a choice. It may:

  • regard the fact as proved unless disproved; or
  • call for proof of the fact.

Example: Imagine that the law permits a court to presume a certain fact from surrounding circumstances. The court is not compelled to accept the presumption. It can ask the party relying on it to provide additional proof.

Therefore: “May presume” = discretion.

Section 2(1) (i): “Not Proved”

A fact is not proved when it is neither proved nor disproved. Law does not operate only in two boxes:

  • true; or
  • false.

Sometimes the evidence is simply insufficient to reach either conclusion.

Example: A claims that B gave him ₹5 lakh in cash. A produces no receipt, no bank record and no independent witness. B denies receiving the money. If the court cannot confidently accept either version, the fact may be not proved.

The concept is therefore a reminder that failure to establish a fact is not always the same as positively proving that the fact did not occur.

 Section 2(1) (j): “Proved”

 A fact is proved when, after considering the material before it, the Court:

  • believes that the fact exists; or
  • considers its existence so probable that a prudent person would act on the assumption that it exists.

This definition retains the traditional “prudent person” test of Indian evidence law.

In Suman Devi v. Mahesh Arora, while discussing the corresponding provision of the IEA, the Delhi High Court explained that evidence and proof are not synonymous and that proof concerns the degree of belief or probability reached by the court after evaluating the material before it.

Standard of Proof: Civil and Criminal Proceedings

Section 2(1) (j) itself does not prescribe separate phrases such as “preponderance of probabilities” and “beyond reasonable doubt.” Those standards have largely developed through judicial precedent.

Civil cases - The usual standard is preponderance of probabilities. The court asks: Which version is more probable?

Criminal cases - The prosecution generally has to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. This does not mean absolute or mathematical certainty. It means that the evidence must cross the high threshold required before a person can be convicted of a crime.

Thus, the same basic statutory concept of “proved” operates within different evidentiary standards developed by judicial precedent.

 Section 2(1) (k): “Relevant”

A fact is relevant to another fact when it is connected with that fact in any of the ways specified by the provisions of the BSA dealing with the relevancy of facts.

Example: A is accused of poisoning B. Evidence that A purchased poison shortly before B became ill may be relevant, depending upon the circumstances and the applicable provisions. But relevance does not automatically mean that the evidence is sufficient to establish guilt.

This distinction is essential: Relevant evidence may assist the court, but relevant evidence is not necessarily conclusive evidence.

Relevance, Admissibility and Proof — Three Different Ideas

Relevance: Does the fact have a legally recognized connection with the matter being decided?

Admissibility: Does the law permit the court to receive and consider that material?

Proof: After considering admissible material, has the fact been established to the required standard?

Example: Suppose CCTV footage appears to show A near the scene of a crime.

  • The footage may be relevant.
  • It must satisfy the applicable rules for admission and proof.
  • Even if admitted, it may not by itself prove that A committed the crime.

This three-stage understanding prevents many common mistakes in evidence analysis.

Section 2(1) (l): “Shall Presume”

 Where the BSA provides that the Court shall presume a fact, the Court must regard that fact as proved unless and until it is disproved.

Therefore: “Shall presume” creates a mandatory rebuttable presumption.

Example: If the statute says that upon proof of Fact A, the Court shall presume Fact B, the court cannot simply refuse to draw the presumption. However, the opposing party may ordinarily attempt to rebut it if the relevant provision permits rebuttal.

 

Concept

Effect

May presume

Court has discretion

Shall presume

Court must presume unless rebutted

Conclusive proof

Court must treat the fact as proved and cannot allow evidence to disprove it


Section 2(2): Definitions from Other Laws

Section 2(2) contains an important interpretative rule.

Where a word or expression is:

  • used in the BSA,
  • not defined in the BSA,

but is defined in the:

  • Information Technology Act, 2000;
  • Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023; or
  • Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023,

it carries the meaning assigned to it in the relevant legislation, unless the context requires otherwise.

Example: Suppose a term used in the BSA is not defined there but has a defined meaning under the Information Technology Act, 2000. That statutory meaning can be used when interpreting the BSA, subject to context.

 

 Conclusion

Sections 1 and 2 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 provide the foundation upon which the rest of Indian evidence law now operates. The BSA therefore represents both continuity and transition. Its foundational concepts remain deeply connected with the jurisprudence developed under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, while its explicit treatment of electronic and digital records reflects the realities of twenty-first-century litigation.

REFERENCES


Sunday, September 21, 2025

RECOVERY OF RENT - CASE STUDY

TITLE: JYOTI SHARMA v. VISHNU GOYAL & ANR. 

CASE NO. - Civil Appeal No. ….. of 2025 (@ SLP (C) No. 29500 of 2024)

JURISDICTION - Civil Appellate Jurisdiction (Supreme Court of India)

APPELLANT - Jyoti Sharma 

RESPONDENTS - Vishnu Goyal and another

BENCH - J. K Vinod Chandran


Introduction

This case concerns a dispute over ownership, recovery of rent, and eviction from a rented shop room. The core legal issues involve the validity of a will, landlord-tenant relationship, estoppel against tenants, and bona fide requirement under rent control legislation. The litigation proceeded through the Trial Court, Appellate Court, High Court, and finally culminated in an appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India.

Factual Matrix

  1. Origin of Tenancy - A shop room forming part of a larger building was let out by Ramji Das (father-in-law of the present plaintiff) to Kishori Lal, the father of the defendants, for conducting a grocery business. Upon the death of Kishori Lal, the defendants (his sons) continued the tenancy and occupation of the shop room. 
  2. Status of Plaintiff - The plaintiff's husband, son of Ramji Das, operated a sweets and savories business in a portion of the same building. The plaintiff's family resided on the first floor of the premises, indicating her continued and substantial connection with the building.
  3. Execution of Will - Ramji Das passed away on 17.08.1999Before his death, he executed a registered will dated 12.05.1999, bequeathing the suit shop to his daughter-in-law (the plaintiff). The will was not contested by any other heir.
  4. Institution of Suit - The plaintiff, relying on the will, filed a civil suit for eviction and recovery of arrears of rent from January 2000 onwards. 

    Grounds for eviction included d

    efault in payment of rent and bona fide personal requirement for the shop premises.

Defendants’ Plea

  1. Dispute of Title - The defendants denied the title of Ramji Das, asserting that the property actually belonged to his paternal uncle, Sua Lal, who died intestate in 1984. Alleged that Ramji Das had no right to execute a will for the disputed shop.
  2. Challenge to Will - The will was assailed as forged and fabricated. Defendants argued that the will had no legal effect and that the plaintiff was a stranger to the tenancy.
  3. No Attornment - Contended that there was no attornment of tenancy in favor of the plaintiff post the death of Ramji Das. Rent, if any, was paid to the plaintiff’s husband (son of Ramji Das), not to the plaintiff directly.
  4. Admission - 

    Notably, the defendants admitted t

    hat a registered rent deed was executed by Ramji Das. That rent was regularly paid to Ramji Das during his lifetime. That rent was paid to the plaintiff’s husband after Ramji Das's death.

Plaintiff’s Legal Arguments

  1. Will and Probate - Plaintiff produced an order dated 09.02.2018 passed by the Additional District Judge in Probate Case No. 8 of 2013, granting probate of the will dated 12.05.1999. Contended that the probate gave legal sanctity to her claim and ownership.
  2. Collection of Rent - Asserted that her husband collected rent on her behalf, both before and after Ramji Das’s death. Emphasized that tenants were aware of the will and the change in ownership.
  3. Registered Notice to Tenants - The tenants were served with a registered notice informing them about the will and change in ownership. This was sufficient for legal attornment of tenancy.
  4. Relinquishment Deed - Relied on Exhibit R-18, a relinquishment deed, executed by other legal heirs in her favor, further strengthening her claim to ownership.

Procedural History

  1. Trial Court - H

    eld that p

    laintiff failed to prove ownership and the existence of landlord-tenant relationship. Suit dismissed for recovery of rent and eviction.
  2. First Appellate Court - Remanded certain issues to Trial Court for further consideration. No relief ultimately granted.
  3. High Court (Second Appeal) - Affirmed the findings of the lower courts. Held that the plaintiff had no locus standi to file the suit in the absence of proof of ownership and attornment. 
  4. Supreme Court - Plaintiff approached the Supreme Court via a Special Leave Petition.

Issues Before the Supreme Court

  1. Whether the plaintiff had valid ownership and locus standi to file the suit based on the will of Ramji Das?

  2. Whether the tenants were estopped from denying the title of Ramji Das?

  3. Whether there existed a landlord-tenant relationship between the plaintiff and the defendants?

  4. Whether the plaintiff was entitled to recovery of rent arrears and eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement?

Judgment of the Supreme Court

The Hon’ble Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the judgments of the Trial Court, Appellate Court, and High Court.

Key Observations:

  1. Estoppel Against Tenants - 

    The Court held that the tenants were estopped from challenging the title of Ramji Das, since t

    hey entered the premises under a registered rent deed executed by him. They paid rent for over 50 years to Ramji Das and thereafter to his son. The source of the landlord’s title is immaterial to tenants once tenancy is established. 
  2. Validity of the Will - The will had been probated by a competent court, and thus attained legal finality. Even though probate is not mandatory in all civil suits, once granted, it confers legal sanctity on the will. The High Court erred in disregarding the probated will without any challenge to it by legal heirs.
  3. Existence of Landlord-Tenant Relationship - Sufficient evidence was available to establish that the plaintiff became the landlord by virtue of the will and attornment. Registered notice and continued rent payment to the plaintiff’s husband on her behalf proved tenancy continued under her.
  4. Bona Fide Requirement and Rent Arrears - Default in payment of rent since January 2000 was established. Plaintiff’s genuine need for the premises for her own use was upheld. The plaintiff had satisfied both grounds under rent control law - default and bona fide personal requirement.

Final Directions by the Supreme Court

  1. Decreed eviction of the defendants from the suit premises.

  2. Ordered recovery of rent arrears from January 2000 until the date of actual possession.

  3. Declared the plaintiff as the lawful owner and landlady of the premises.

  4. Directed that all pending applications in connection with the matter be disposed of accordingly.

Legal Significance and Precedent Value

This judgment is significant for the following legal propositions:

  • A tenant cannot dispute the title of the landlord through whom possession was obtained.

  • Once probate of a will is granted, it is conclusive proof of the testator's intent unless annulled in probate proceedings.

  • Attornment of tenancy can be inferred from conduct, service of notice, and payment of rent, even if indirect.

  • A genuine personal requirement for the suit premises, coupled with rent default, constitutes valid grounds for eviction.

  • Relinquishment deeds by other heirs further bolster the legatee’s title.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court reaffirmed the importance of respecting landlord-tenant obligations and held that technical objections regarding ownership cannot defeat the statutory rights of a rightful landlady under tenancy law. It emphasized the need to prevent tenants from using frivolous defenses to defeat legitimate claims and upheld the sanctity of probated wills in civil property matters.

READ JUDGEMENT


Tuesday, August 19, 2025

CRIMINAL MOOT PREPOSITION

CRIMINAL APPEAL MOOT COURT PREPOSITION


CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.                      /2024

SAMEERA ............................................................................ APPELLANT

                                           vs

STATE .................................................................................... RESPONDENT

On Submission To The Registry Of The Court Of The Hon'ble Supreme Court Of India


 STATEMENT OF JUSRISDICTION

THE COUNSEL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT, IN THE MATTER, HEREBY, MOST HUMBLY AND RESPECTFULLY SUBMITS TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA UNDER ARTICLE 134 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, SECTION 374(1) AND SECTION 379 OF THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973.


STATEMENT OF FACTS


  • On 23.10.2016, Jay and Sameera got married in South Mumbai in an arrange marriage system.
  • Within two years, Sameera gave birth to a boy with special need which led to increase their expenses because of the treatment of the child. 
  • Due to mismanagement in financial expenditure of the family, Jay due to the stress started drinking alcohol which led to quarrels and arguments every day. 
  • Sameera hid this situation for almost 6 months after conceiving baby from her parents and in – laws in the hope of improvement. 
  • On 02.01.2019, Jay after drinking too much came home and started beating Sameera leaving her with several injuries. 
  • After that Sameera told everything to her parents and in – laws about the situation and they made Jay to promise to quit drinking and focus on his family.
  • But Jay again started drinking in 2021 which led to the fights, aggressive arguments and physical quarrels between the couple again. 
  • On 21.03.2022, Jay when came back home as usual started beating Sameera and continued till 11:00 pm and after that he went to sleep in his bedroom. But Sameera was not to sleep and she wept whole night on her situation.  
  • On 22.03.2022, around 4 am in the morning, she took an iron rod and inflicted some injuries on Jay’s head and vital parts which result in death of Jay.  
  • On the same day, around 8:00 am, her maid came and called the police. The police arrested Sameera and case filed against her.
  • The Sessions Court held Sameera liable for culpable homicide due to her act under grave and sudden provocation. But the High Court convicted Sameera for murder.

ISSUES RAISED


  • ISSUE 1 - WHETHER THE APPELLANT IS LIABLE FOR MURDER OR CULPABLE HOMICIDE?
  • ISSUE 2 - WHETHER THE APPELLANT’S ACTIONS TO CAUSE DEATH OF THE DECEASED QUALIFY AS GRAVE AND SUDDEN PROVOCATION UNDER SECTION 300 OF IPC?
  • ISSUE 3 - WHETHER THE APPELLANT ACTED IN SELF-DEFENCE, OR IN THE DEFENCE OF HER CHILD WHICH WOULD MITIGATE HER LIABILITY?
  • ISSUE 4 - WHETHER THE ONGOING ABUSE, TRAUMA, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL STRESS IMPAIR THE APPELLANT’S JUDGEMENT TO THE EXTENT THAT IT NEGATED INTENT TO KILL?

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS


ISSUE –I: WHETHER THE APPELLANT IS LIABLE FOR MURDER OR CULPABLE HOMICIDE? 

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India that the actions taken by the appellant were premeditated given the time taken to procure the iron rod and inflict fatal injuries on the head and vital parts of the body of the deceased which resulted in the death of the deceased falls under Section 302 or not be considered as a matter of culpable homicide.

ISSUE-II: WHETHER THE APPELLANT’S ACTIONS TO CAUSE DEATH OF THE DECEASED QUALIFY AS GRAVE AND SUDDEN PROVOCATION UNDER SECTION 300 OF IPC? 

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India that the level of provocation was not sufficient to justify the extreme response of murder. The actions taken by the appellant were premeditated given the time taken to procure the iron rod and inflict fatal injuries which resulted in the death of the deceased falls under Section 302; not under grave and sudden provocation under Section 300 of Indian Penal Code, 1860.

ISSUE-III: WHETHER THE APPELLANT ACTED IN SELF-DEFENCE, OR IN THE DEFENCE OF HER CHILD WHICH WOULD MITIGATE HER LIABILITY? 

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India that the immediate threat had subsided once the deceased fell asleep, thereby negating her claim of self – defence. The actions of the appellant clearly postulate her intention to kill the victim and were all premeditated rather than reactive.

ISSUE IV: WHETHER THE ONGOING ABUSE, TRAUMA, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL STRESS IMPAIR THE APPELLANT’S JUDGEMENT TO THE EXTENT THAT IT NEGATED INTENT TO KILL? 

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India that there was a gap between the last incident of violence and the fatal act, that the appellant had time to cool off and consider her actions. While the appellant experienced domestic violence, it does not legally justify the act of murder. The law must maintain a standard against taking the law into one’s own hands.


ARGUMENTS ADVANCED


ISSUE–I: WHETHER THE APPELLANT IS LIABLE FOR MURDER OR CULPABLE HOMICIDE? 

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India that the actions taken by the appellant were premeditated given the time taken to procure the iron rod and inflict fatal injuries on the head and vital parts of the body of the deceased which resulted in the death of the deceased falls under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 or not be considered as a matter of culpable homicide. 

Section 300.Murder – Except in the case hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or – 

Secondly – If it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused, or –

Thirdly – If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or – 

Fourthly – If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid. 

Exception 1 – When culpable homicide is not murder – Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, whilst deprived of the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation, causes the death of any other person who gave the provocation or causes the death of any other person by mistake or accident.

The above exception is subject to the following provisos:- 

First – That the provocation is not sought or voluntarily provoked by the offender as an excuse for killing or doing harm to any person. 

Secondly – That the provocation is not given by anything done in obedience to the law, or by a public servant in the lawful exercise of the powers of such public servant. 

Thirdly – That the provocation is not given by anything done in the lawful exercise of the right of private defence. 

Explanation – Whether the provocation was grave and sudden enough to prevent the offence from amounting to murder is a question of fact. 

Exception 2 – Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, in the exercise in good faith of the right of private defence of person or property, exceeds the power given to him by law and causes the death of the person against whom he is exercising such right of defence without premeditation, and without any intention of doing more harm than is necessary for the purpose of such defence. 

Exception 3 – Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, being a public servant or aiding a public servant acting for the advancement of public justice, exceeds the powers given to him by law, and causes death by doing an act which he, in good faith, believes to be lawful and necessary for the due discharge of his duty as such public servant and without ill-well towards the person whose death is caused. 

Exception 4 – Culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heal of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offender having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. 

Explanation – It is immaterial in such cases which party offers the provocation or commits the first assault. 

Exception 5 – Culpable homicide is not murder when the person whose death is caused, being above the age of eighteen years, suffers death or takes the risk of death with his own consent.

The first clause of Section 300 stipulates that when an act (including legal omission) is done with the intention of causing death, then it is culpable homicide amounting to murder. Intention to cause death can be inferred from the act.

CHAHAT KHAN v. STATE OF HARYANA (AIR 1972 SC 2574)
“In this case, it was stated that since intention is always a state of mind, it can be proved only by its external manifestations. When injuries are inflicted on vital parts of the body, then the intention to kill can be attributed to the offender.”

Therefore, in the present case, the appellant inflicted injuries on the head and vital parts of the body of the deceased with an iron rod which resulted in the on the spot death of the deceased. From the actions of appellant it can be gathered that it is done with the intention to kill the deceased then and there. 

Clause 3 of Section 300 consists of two parts. Under the first part, it has to be shown that there was an intention to inflict the particular injury. The second part requires that the injury intended to be inflicted was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. 

VIRSA SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB (1958 AIR 465, 1958 SCR)
The SC laid down that in order to bring a case within clause (3) of Section 300, the prosecution must prove the following: 
1) It must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present. 
2) The nature of the injury must be proved. 
3) It must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury, that is to say, it was not accidental or unintentional, or some other kind of injury was intended. 
4) It must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the three elements set out above, is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.

In the present case, the appellant has inflicted injuries on the head and vital body parts which are so serious and grave resulted in on the spot death of the deceased. So, it is sufficient to know the intention of the appellant to kill the deceased by inflicting such kind of serious injuries with an iron rod while the deceased was sleeping.

STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH v. RAYAAVARAPU PUAYYA (1977 AIR 45)
In this case, the SC stated that the term “sufficiency” used in Clause 3 of Section 300 is the high probability of death in the ordinary course of nature, and if such “sufficiency” exists and death is caused and the injury causing it is intentional, the case falls under clause 3 of Section 300. 

In the present case, the injuries inflicted on the head and vital body parts with an iron rod are sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death of a person who was not in senses at that time because the deceased was sleeping.

SHANKAR NARAYAN BHADOLKAR v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA (AIR 2004 SC 1966)
The Supreme Court here stated that “For cases to fall within clause (3), it is not necessary that the offender intended to cause death, so long as the death ensues from the intentional bodily injury or injuries sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. 

Therefore, it can be stated that even if the appellant has no intention to cause the death of the deceased, but the injuries inflicted on head and vital body parts of the deceased; also in the condition that he cannot be able to safe himself can be considered as sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.

ISSUE-II: WHETHER THE APPELLANT’S ACTIONS TO CAUSE DEATH OF THE DECEASED QUALIFY AS GRAVE AND SUDDEN PROVOCATION UNDER SECTION 300 OF IPC?

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India that the level of provocation was not sufficient to justify the extreme response of murder. The actions taken by the appellant were premeditated given the time taken to procure the iron rod and inflict fatal injuries which resulted in the death of the deceased falls under Section 302; not under grave and sudden provocation under Section 300 of Indian Penal Code, 1860.

Section 300.Murder 

Exception1. – When culpable homicide is not murder. – Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, whilst deprived of the power of self – control by grave and sudden provocation, causes the death of the person who gave the provocation or causes the death of any other person by mistake or accident. 

The above exception is subject to the following provisos:- 

First – That the provocation is not sought or voluntarily provoked by the offender as an excuse for killing or doing harm to any person. 

Secondly – That the provocation is not given by anything done in obedience to the law, or by a public servant in the lawful exercise of the powers of such public servant.

Thirdly – That the provocation is not given by anything done in the lawful exercise of the right of private defence. 

Explanation – Whether the provocation was grave and sudden enough to prevent the offence from amounting to murder is a question of fact.

In order to apply this exception, the provocation should be both grave and sudden. If the provocation is sudden but not grave, or grave but nor sudden, then the offender cannot avail of the benefit of this exception. It should also be shown that the provocation was of such a nature that the offender was deprived of the power of self – control.

BD KHUNTE v. UOI (AIR 1962 SC 605)
In this case, the SC stated that “Grave provocation” within the meaning of Exception 1 to Section 300 is a provocation where judgement and reason take leave of the offender and violent passion takes over.

SUKHLAL SARKAR v. UOI (2012 SC)
In this case, the SC stated that the word “Sudden” in Exception 1 of Section 300 means an action which must be quick and unexpected so far as to provoke the accused. 

Therefore, from the above stated points and cases cited, it is clear that the exception of grave and sudden provocation claimed by the appellant is not correct. As the meaning of grave and sudden provocation does not fit in the actions taken by the appellant in the present case.

K.M. NANAVATI v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA (1962 AIR) 
In this case, the SC laid down the following postulates relating to grave and sudden provocation: 
1) The test of “grave and sudden” provocation is whether a reasonable man, belonging to the same class of society as the accused, placed in the situation in which the accused was placed, would be so provoked as to lose his self – control. 
2) In India, words and gestures may also, under certain circumstances, cause grave and sudden provocation to an accused, so as to bring his act within the first exception to section 300, IPC. 
3) The mental background created by the previous act of the victim may be taken into consideration in ascertaining whether the subsequent act caused grave and sudden provocation for committing the offence. 
4) The fatal blow should be clearly traced to the influence of passion arising from that provocation and not after the passion has cooled down by lapse of time, or otherwise giving room and scope for premeditation and calculation. 

The Supreme Court held that the accused, after his wife confessed to her illicit relationship with the deceased, may momentarily lost control. He had thereafter dropped his wife and children at a cinema, went to the ship, collected the revolver, did some official business there, and drove his car to the office of the deceased and later to his home. Three hours had lapsed by then and therefore, there was sufficient time for him to regain his self – control. In view of this, the court held that the provisions of Exception 1 to section 300 were not attracted. The accused was convicted for murder and sentenced to life imprisonment.

Thus, it is evident from the landmark judgement cited that when there is a cooling period in which there is sufficient time for the accused to regain self – control. Therefore, the appellant in the present case also has the time around 4 – 5 hours to gain self – control because the beating ended at 11:00 pm and the appellant killed the deceased at 4:00 am the next morning.

R v. DUFFY (1965)
In this case, the test was laid down by Lord Devlin that the requirement of ‘sudden and grave’ does not allow for the defence to succeed if there is a lapse of time between the provocation and killing. 

Therefore, in the present case there is enough lapse of time between the provocation given by beating of appellant and killing of the deceased. So, according to the case cited above, the present case does not fall under the exception of grave and sudden provocation.

R v. AHLUWALIA (1992)
In this case, the Court rejected the defence of provocation because there was a cooling period, lapse in time between provocation and killing. 

So, as per the above cited case also, when there is a time gap between provocation and killing that is considered as cooling period, then it does not comes under the purview of grave and sudden provocation. And in the present case, there is also a cooling period between the provocation and killing, so the appellant is not liable for culpable homicide but murder of the deceased under Section 300 of IPC.

YATENDRASINGH AJABSINGH v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA (2022)
In this case, the SC reiterated that to determine whether or not a certain act constitutes provocation of the requisite nature, the facts and circumstances of each case must be analyzed. It is essential to note that the graveness and suddenness of the provocation must both be simultaneous. This implies that – 

Firstly, the provocation must not only be grave but also sudden, and that it must be uninvited and unforeseen; 

Secondly, the act of the accused must be derived from the provocation of such nature. 

So, from the judgement cited above and taking in consideration the present case; it can be stated that the act of the appellant was not derived from the provocation as it can be grave but not sudden; graveness and suddenness must be simultaneous; which does not fit in this case.

ISSUE-III: WHETHER THE APPELLANT ACTED IN SELF – DEFENCE, OR IN THE DEFENCE OF HER CHILD WHICH WOULD MITIGATE HER LIABILITY?

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India that the immediate threat had subsided once the deceased fell asleep, thereby negating her claim of self – defence. The actions of the appellant clearly postulate her intention to kill the deceased and were all premeditated rather than reactive. 

SECTION 300.MURDER

EXCEPTION 2 – Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, in the exercise in good faith of the right of private defence of person or property, exceeds the power given to him by law and causes the death of the person against whom he is exercising such right of defence without premeditation, and without any intention of doing more harm than is necessary for the purpose of such defence. 

The Exception 2 to Section 300 stipulates that the exceeding of the right of private defence should be without pre-meditation, and without any intention of doing more harm than necessary for the purpose of coverage by the exception. In other words, the exceeding of private defence by the accused should be done unintentionally. Only then can the accused avail of the exception provided under this clause.

ONKARNATH SINGH v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH (1974 AIR)
In this case, the deceased party has initially attempted to attack the accused party. There was an incident of grappling between the parties. When the deceased party was fleeing, the accused party made a murderous assault. It was held that in this case that since the murder was committed when the deceased were fleeing, the right of private defence ended with that, since the right is co-terminus with the commencement and existence of a reasonable apprehension of danger to body or property and not after the threat has ceased to exist. 
The Supreme Court held that the accused were guilty of vindictive and maliciously excessive act. The force used was out of all proportion to the supposed danger, which no longer existed from the deceased party. Under the circumstances, it was held that the accused were neither entitled to a right of private defence, not to the benefit of Exception 2 to section 300 IPC. 

Keeping in view the judgement cited above and the facts of the present case, it can stated that the killing of deceased by the appellant cannot be considered as an act of private defence because it was time when the deceased was sleeping peacefully and appellant approached him with an iron rod and started hitting him on the head directly and vital body parts, it clearly shows her ill-will to kill the deceased and not any act of self-defence.

KATTU SURENDRA v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH (2008 AIR)
The SC ruled in this case that death caused by a person after his right to private defence ceases to exist falls outside the ambit of the exception. 

Therefore, in the present case, when the deceased went to sleep the right of private defence ceases to exist for the appellant, therefore the act of the appellant causing death of the deceased falls outside the ambit of Exception 2 to section 300 IPC. 

RAJ SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA (2015 AIR)
The SC in this case has beautifully articulated the manner of judicial determination of claim of the accused that he has caused homicide by exceeding his lawful right of private defence. It observed: 

Absence of good faith in the exercise of the right of private defence, premeditation for the exercise of such right and acts done with the intention of causing more than harm than is necessary for the purpose of such defence would deny to the offender the benefit of Exception 2 to section 300. 

Considering the present case and judgement above, it can be stated that the appellant had sufficient time for gaining self-control and the act of causing death of the deceased in the morning after the time gap of 4-5 hours when he was sleeping. So, it is clear that the actions of the appellant were premeditated and there was a clear intention of killing the deceased rather than acting in self-defence.


SINGH & ORS v. STATE OF HARYANA (CRM 2022)
 In this case, the SC observed that the exception of good faith is a must before the accused claims benefit of the Exception 2 to section 300. While acting in good faith, if the accused has exceeded the right of self-defence and caused death of a person without pre-meditation and further he had no intention to causing more than was necessary for the purpose of the defence although in fact more harm was caused, the benefit of Exception 2 to section 300 may be available if the accused was not the aggressor. 

In the present case, the appellant had not acted in good faith which can be understand from the actions of appellant to hit and inflict injuries to the deceased on his head first and then vital body parts which shows that the appellant had full intention to kill the deceased and not only hurt him. The right of private defence taken by the appellant also cannot be supported as the act done by her was during the sleeping of deceased. Therefore, while sleeping of the deceased how the appellant can claim the right of self-defence here and also the deceased had never cause any kind of hurt to his child. So, the appellant is wrong in taking the right to selfdefence of her and her child. 


ISSUE IV: WHETHER THE ONGOING ABUSE, TRAUMA, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL STRESS IMPAIR THE APPELLANT’S JUDGEMENT TO THE EXTENT THAT IT NEGATED INTENT TO KILL?

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India that there was a gap between the last incident of violence and the fatal act, that the appellant had time to cool off and consider her actions. While the appellant experienced domestic violence, it does not legally justify the act of murder. The law must maintain a standard against taking the law into one’s own hands.

R v. AHLUWALIA (1992)
In this case, the Court stated that women who have been subjected frequently over a period to violent treatment may react to the final act or words by what he calls a “slow-burn” reaction rather than by an immediate loss of self-control. We accept that the subjective element in the defence of provocation would not as a matter of law be negative simply because of the delayed reaction in such cases, provided that there was at the time of the killing a “sudden and temporary loss of self-control” caused by the alleged provocation. However, the longer the delay and the stronger the evidence of deliberation on the part of the defendant, the more likely it will be that the prosecution will negative provocation.

So, it can be pointed out from the above judgement cited that when there is time gap between the provocation and killing; the longer the delay, there are more chances to negate the provocation. As per in the present case, there are almost 4-5 hours time lapse between the provocation and killing of the deceased. The time period of 4-5 hours can be considered as sufficient to re-gain self-control and effect of provocation in such time remains less.

SUSTAINED PROVOCATION 

The concept of provocation works very differently in cases of battery as it is a long-term and continuous process, and it is very difficult to analyse a specific trigger point that resulted in the commission of the offence. This is a case of sustained provocation. That is why these cases cannot be measured strictly by the objectivity test, as it goes against the principle of equity, natural justice, and good conscience.

‘Sustained Provocation Principle’ doesn’t go away with the requirement of immediate or the final provocative act, words or gesture, the Court noted that cumulative or sustained provocation test was immediately preceded and precipitated by some sort of provocative conduct, which would satisfy the requirement of sudden or immediate provocation. 

This defence would not be available if there is evidence of reflection or planning as they mirror exercise of calculation and premeditation, it added.

K.M. NANAVATI v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA (1962 AIR 605)
The SC relied on a series of notable precedents to draw the inference and held that the mental background created by the previous act(s) of the deceased may be taken into consideration in ascertaining whether the subsequent act caused sudden and grave provocation for committing the offence. 

“It referred to wherein the conditions which have to be satisfied to invoke the exception were defined. It was also held in the judgement that for determining whether or not the provocation had temporarily deprived the offender from the power of self-control, the test to be applied is that of a reasonable man and not that of an unusually excitable and pugnacious individual. Further, it must be considered whether there was sufficient interval and time to allow the passion to cool.” 

In the present case, the appellant had acted after a sufficient time interval and there is enough time available for her passion to cool down; which does not fall under the criteria provided the above cited judgement; therefore, the appellant is not right to claim the defence of sustained provocation in which she had been deprived from the power of self-control.

BUDDHI SINGH v. STATE OF H.P. (2012)
The SC observed that in the test for application of Exception 1 to Section 300 IPC, the primary obligation of the court is to examine the circumstances from the point of view of a person of reasonable prudence. 

“The idea behind this exception is to exclude the acts of violence which are premeditated, and not to deny consideration of circumstances such as prior animosity between the deceased and the accused, arising as a result of incidents in the past and subsequently resulting in sudden and grave provocation.” 

Taking in consideration the above cited judgement of the SC, it can be stated that in the present case, there was not any denial of animosity, instances of domestic violence and abuse by the deceased; but the final act of the appellant was clearly shown as premeditated which excluded her from the purview to fall under Exception 1 to Section 300 IPC.

BHURA RAM & ORS. v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ANR. (AIR 2008)
The SC reaffirmed in this case that another aspect of the mental state of the accused is the lack of preparation on their part. The provocation must come unexpectedly; hence, the provision that the provocation must not be sought by the accused and must not be expected in any manner. 

In the present case, the appellant after the cooling period took an iron rod and hit the deceased on his head firstly and after that on his vital body parts which resulted in on-the spot death of the deceased; clearly shows that the provocation did not come unexpectedly and the appellant had prepared on her part for such act.


PRAYER


WHEREFORE, in light of the facts presented, issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, the Counsel on Behalf of the Respondent humbly pay before the Hon’ble Court that it may be pleased to adjudge and declare: 

1. Uphold the conviction of the appellant. 
2. Liable for the murder of the deceased. 
                                                        And/Or 
Pass any other Order, Direction, or Relief that it may deem fit in the best interests of Justice, Fairness, Equity and Good Conscience. 

FOR THIS ACT OF KINDNESS, THE RESPONDENT SHALL DUTY BOUND FOREVER PRAY. 

All of which is respectfully submitted. 

                                                                                                                                                               Sd/-
                                                                                                                      On Behalf Of The Respondent

Sections 1 and 2 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023

Abstract The Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (“BSA”) is one of the three major criminal-law reforms introduced in India to replace the col...