Tuesday, August 19, 2025

CRIMINAL MOOT PREPOSITION

CRIMINAL APPEAL MOOT COURT PREPOSITION


CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.                      /2024

SAMEERA ............................................................................ APPELLANT

                                           vs

STATE .................................................................................... RESPONDENT

On Submission To The Registry Of The Court Of The Hon'ble Supreme Court Of India


 STATEMENT OF JUSRISDICTION

THE COUNSEL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT, IN THE MATTER, HEREBY, MOST HUMBLY AND RESPECTFULLY SUBMITS TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA UNDER ARTICLE 134 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, SECTION 374(1) AND SECTION 379 OF THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973.


STATEMENT OF FACTS


  • On 23.10.2016, Jay and Sameera got married in South Mumbai in an arrange marriage system.
  • Within two years, Sameera gave birth to a boy with special need which led to increase their expenses because of the treatment of the child. 
  • Due to mismanagement in financial expenditure of the family, Jay due to the stress started drinking alcohol which led to quarrels and arguments every day. 
  • Sameera hid this situation for almost 6 months after conceiving baby from her parents and in – laws in the hope of improvement. 
  • On 02.01.2019, Jay after drinking too much came home and started beating Sameera leaving her with several injuries. 
  • After that Sameera told everything to her parents and in – laws about the situation and they made Jay to promise to quit drinking and focus on his family.
  • But Jay again started drinking in 2021 which led to the fights, aggressive arguments and physical quarrels between the couple again. 
  • On 21.03.2022, Jay when came back home as usual started beating Sameera and continued till 11:00 pm and after that he went to sleep in his bedroom. But Sameera was not to sleep and she wept whole night on her situation.  
  • On 22.03.2022, around 4 am in the morning, she took an iron rod and inflicted some injuries on Jay’s head and vital parts which result in death of Jay.  
  • On the same day, around 8:00 am, her maid came and called the police. The police arrested Sameera and case filed against her.
  • The Sessions Court held Sameera liable for culpable homicide due to her act under grave and sudden provocation. But the High Court convicted Sameera for murder.

ISSUES RAISED


  • ISSUE 1 - WHETHER THE APPELLANT IS LIABLE FOR MURDER OR CULPABLE HOMICIDE?
  • ISSUE 2 - WHETHER THE APPELLANT’S ACTIONS TO CAUSE DEATH OF THE DECEASED QUALIFY AS GRAVE AND SUDDEN PROVOCATION UNDER SECTION 300 OF IPC?
  • ISSUE 3 - WHETHER THE APPELLANT ACTED IN SELF-DEFENCE, OR IN THE DEFENCE OF HER CHILD WHICH WOULD MITIGATE HER LIABILITY?
  • ISSUE 4 - WHETHER THE ONGOING ABUSE, TRAUMA, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL STRESS IMPAIR THE APPELLANT’S JUDGEMENT TO THE EXTENT THAT IT NEGATED INTENT TO KILL?

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS


ISSUE –I: WHETHER THE APPELLANT IS LIABLE FOR MURDER OR CULPABLE HOMICIDE? 

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India that the actions taken by the appellant were premeditated given the time taken to procure the iron rod and inflict fatal injuries on the head and vital parts of the body of the deceased which resulted in the death of the deceased falls under Section 302 or not be considered as a matter of culpable homicide.

ISSUE-II: WHETHER THE APPELLANT’S ACTIONS TO CAUSE DEATH OF THE DECEASED QUALIFY AS GRAVE AND SUDDEN PROVOCATION UNDER SECTION 300 OF IPC? 

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India that the level of provocation was not sufficient to justify the extreme response of murder. The actions taken by the appellant were premeditated given the time taken to procure the iron rod and inflict fatal injuries which resulted in the death of the deceased falls under Section 302; not under grave and sudden provocation under Section 300 of Indian Penal Code, 1860.

ISSUE-III: WHETHER THE APPELLANT ACTED IN SELF-DEFENCE, OR IN THE DEFENCE OF HER CHILD WHICH WOULD MITIGATE HER LIABILITY? 

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India that the immediate threat had subsided once the deceased fell asleep, thereby negating her claim of self – defence. The actions of the appellant clearly postulate her intention to kill the victim and were all premeditated rather than reactive.

ISSUE IV: WHETHER THE ONGOING ABUSE, TRAUMA, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL STRESS IMPAIR THE APPELLANT’S JUDGEMENT TO THE EXTENT THAT IT NEGATED INTENT TO KILL? 

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India that there was a gap between the last incident of violence and the fatal act, that the appellant had time to cool off and consider her actions. While the appellant experienced domestic violence, it does not legally justify the act of murder. The law must maintain a standard against taking the law into one’s own hands.


ARGUMENTS ADVANCED


ISSUE–I: WHETHER THE APPELLANT IS LIABLE FOR MURDER OR CULPABLE HOMICIDE? 

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India that the actions taken by the appellant were premeditated given the time taken to procure the iron rod and inflict fatal injuries on the head and vital parts of the body of the deceased which resulted in the death of the deceased falls under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 or not be considered as a matter of culpable homicide. 

Section 300.Murder – Except in the case hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or – 

Secondly – If it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused, or –

Thirdly – If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or – 

Fourthly – If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid. 

Exception 1 – When culpable homicide is not murder – Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, whilst deprived of the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation, causes the death of any other person who gave the provocation or causes the death of any other person by mistake or accident.

The above exception is subject to the following provisos:- 

First – That the provocation is not sought or voluntarily provoked by the offender as an excuse for killing or doing harm to any person. 

Secondly – That the provocation is not given by anything done in obedience to the law, or by a public servant in the lawful exercise of the powers of such public servant. 

Thirdly – That the provocation is not given by anything done in the lawful exercise of the right of private defence. 

Explanation – Whether the provocation was grave and sudden enough to prevent the offence from amounting to murder is a question of fact. 

Exception 2 – Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, in the exercise in good faith of the right of private defence of person or property, exceeds the power given to him by law and causes the death of the person against whom he is exercising such right of defence without premeditation, and without any intention of doing more harm than is necessary for the purpose of such defence. 

Exception 3 – Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, being a public servant or aiding a public servant acting for the advancement of public justice, exceeds the powers given to him by law, and causes death by doing an act which he, in good faith, believes to be lawful and necessary for the due discharge of his duty as such public servant and without ill-well towards the person whose death is caused. 

Exception 4 – Culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heal of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offender having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. 

Explanation – It is immaterial in such cases which party offers the provocation or commits the first assault. 

Exception 5 – Culpable homicide is not murder when the person whose death is caused, being above the age of eighteen years, suffers death or takes the risk of death with his own consent.

The first clause of Section 300 stipulates that when an act (including legal omission) is done with the intention of causing death, then it is culpable homicide amounting to murder. Intention to cause death can be inferred from the act.

CHAHAT KHAN v. STATE OF HARYANA (AIR 1972 SC 2574)
“In this case, it was stated that since intention is always a state of mind, it can be proved only by its external manifestations. When injuries are inflicted on vital parts of the body, then the intention to kill can be attributed to the offender.”

Therefore, in the present case, the appellant inflicted injuries on the head and vital parts of the body of the deceased with an iron rod which resulted in the on the spot death of the deceased. From the actions of appellant it can be gathered that it is done with the intention to kill the deceased then and there. 

Clause 3 of Section 300 consists of two parts. Under the first part, it has to be shown that there was an intention to inflict the particular injury. The second part requires that the injury intended to be inflicted was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. 

VIRSA SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB (1958 AIR 465, 1958 SCR)
The SC laid down that in order to bring a case within clause (3) of Section 300, the prosecution must prove the following: 
1) It must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present. 
2) The nature of the injury must be proved. 
3) It must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury, that is to say, it was not accidental or unintentional, or some other kind of injury was intended. 
4) It must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the three elements set out above, is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.

In the present case, the appellant has inflicted injuries on the head and vital body parts which are so serious and grave resulted in on the spot death of the deceased. So, it is sufficient to know the intention of the appellant to kill the deceased by inflicting such kind of serious injuries with an iron rod while the deceased was sleeping.

STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH v. RAYAAVARAPU PUAYYA (1977 AIR 45)
In this case, the SC stated that the term “sufficiency” used in Clause 3 of Section 300 is the high probability of death in the ordinary course of nature, and if such “sufficiency” exists and death is caused and the injury causing it is intentional, the case falls under clause 3 of Section 300. 

In the present case, the injuries inflicted on the head and vital body parts with an iron rod are sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death of a person who was not in senses at that time because the deceased was sleeping.

SHANKAR NARAYAN BHADOLKAR v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA (AIR 2004 SC 1966)
The Supreme Court here stated that “For cases to fall within clause (3), it is not necessary that the offender intended to cause death, so long as the death ensues from the intentional bodily injury or injuries sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. 

Therefore, it can be stated that even if the appellant has no intention to cause the death of the deceased, but the injuries inflicted on head and vital body parts of the deceased; also in the condition that he cannot be able to safe himself can be considered as sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.

ISSUE-II: WHETHER THE APPELLANT’S ACTIONS TO CAUSE DEATH OF THE DECEASED QUALIFY AS GRAVE AND SUDDEN PROVOCATION UNDER SECTION 300 OF IPC?

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India that the level of provocation was not sufficient to justify the extreme response of murder. The actions taken by the appellant were premeditated given the time taken to procure the iron rod and inflict fatal injuries which resulted in the death of the deceased falls under Section 302; not under grave and sudden provocation under Section 300 of Indian Penal Code, 1860.

Section 300.Murder 

Exception1. – When culpable homicide is not murder. – Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, whilst deprived of the power of self – control by grave and sudden provocation, causes the death of the person who gave the provocation or causes the death of any other person by mistake or accident. 

The above exception is subject to the following provisos:- 

First – That the provocation is not sought or voluntarily provoked by the offender as an excuse for killing or doing harm to any person. 

Secondly – That the provocation is not given by anything done in obedience to the law, or by a public servant in the lawful exercise of the powers of such public servant.

Thirdly – That the provocation is not given by anything done in the lawful exercise of the right of private defence. 

Explanation – Whether the provocation was grave and sudden enough to prevent the offence from amounting to murder is a question of fact.

In order to apply this exception, the provocation should be both grave and sudden. If the provocation is sudden but not grave, or grave but nor sudden, then the offender cannot avail of the benefit of this exception. It should also be shown that the provocation was of such a nature that the offender was deprived of the power of self – control.

BD KHUNTE v. UOI (AIR 1962 SC 605)
In this case, the SC stated that “Grave provocation” within the meaning of Exception 1 to Section 300 is a provocation where judgement and reason take leave of the offender and violent passion takes over.

SUKHLAL SARKAR v. UOI (2012 SC)
In this case, the SC stated that the word “Sudden” in Exception 1 of Section 300 means an action which must be quick and unexpected so far as to provoke the accused. 

Therefore, from the above stated points and cases cited, it is clear that the exception of grave and sudden provocation claimed by the appellant is not correct. As the meaning of grave and sudden provocation does not fit in the actions taken by the appellant in the present case.

K.M. NANAVATI v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA (1962 AIR) 
In this case, the SC laid down the following postulates relating to grave and sudden provocation: 
1) The test of “grave and sudden” provocation is whether a reasonable man, belonging to the same class of society as the accused, placed in the situation in which the accused was placed, would be so provoked as to lose his self – control. 
2) In India, words and gestures may also, under certain circumstances, cause grave and sudden provocation to an accused, so as to bring his act within the first exception to section 300, IPC. 
3) The mental background created by the previous act of the victim may be taken into consideration in ascertaining whether the subsequent act caused grave and sudden provocation for committing the offence. 
4) The fatal blow should be clearly traced to the influence of passion arising from that provocation and not after the passion has cooled down by lapse of time, or otherwise giving room and scope for premeditation and calculation. 

The Supreme Court held that the accused, after his wife confessed to her illicit relationship with the deceased, may momentarily lost control. He had thereafter dropped his wife and children at a cinema, went to the ship, collected the revolver, did some official business there, and drove his car to the office of the deceased and later to his home. Three hours had lapsed by then and therefore, there was sufficient time for him to regain his self – control. In view of this, the court held that the provisions of Exception 1 to section 300 were not attracted. The accused was convicted for murder and sentenced to life imprisonment.

Thus, it is evident from the landmark judgement cited that when there is a cooling period in which there is sufficient time for the accused to regain self – control. Therefore, the appellant in the present case also has the time around 4 – 5 hours to gain self – control because the beating ended at 11:00 pm and the appellant killed the deceased at 4:00 am the next morning.

R v. DUFFY (1965)
In this case, the test was laid down by Lord Devlin that the requirement of ‘sudden and grave’ does not allow for the defence to succeed if there is a lapse of time between the provocation and killing. 

Therefore, in the present case there is enough lapse of time between the provocation given by beating of appellant and killing of the deceased. So, according to the case cited above, the present case does not fall under the exception of grave and sudden provocation.

R v. AHLUWALIA (1992)
In this case, the Court rejected the defence of provocation because there was a cooling period, lapse in time between provocation and killing. 

So, as per the above cited case also, when there is a time gap between provocation and killing that is considered as cooling period, then it does not comes under the purview of grave and sudden provocation. And in the present case, there is also a cooling period between the provocation and killing, so the appellant is not liable for culpable homicide but murder of the deceased under Section 300 of IPC.

YATENDRASINGH AJABSINGH v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA (2022)
In this case, the SC reiterated that to determine whether or not a certain act constitutes provocation of the requisite nature, the facts and circumstances of each case must be analyzed. It is essential to note that the graveness and suddenness of the provocation must both be simultaneous. This implies that – 

Firstly, the provocation must not only be grave but also sudden, and that it must be uninvited and unforeseen; 

Secondly, the act of the accused must be derived from the provocation of such nature. 

So, from the judgement cited above and taking in consideration the present case; it can be stated that the act of the appellant was not derived from the provocation as it can be grave but not sudden; graveness and suddenness must be simultaneous; which does not fit in this case.

ISSUE-III: WHETHER THE APPELLANT ACTED IN SELF – DEFENCE, OR IN THE DEFENCE OF HER CHILD WHICH WOULD MITIGATE HER LIABILITY?

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India that the immediate threat had subsided once the deceased fell asleep, thereby negating her claim of self – defence. The actions of the appellant clearly postulate her intention to kill the deceased and were all premeditated rather than reactive. 

SECTION 300.MURDER

EXCEPTION 2 – Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, in the exercise in good faith of the right of private defence of person or property, exceeds the power given to him by law and causes the death of the person against whom he is exercising such right of defence without premeditation, and without any intention of doing more harm than is necessary for the purpose of such defence. 

The Exception 2 to Section 300 stipulates that the exceeding of the right of private defence should be without pre-meditation, and without any intention of doing more harm than necessary for the purpose of coverage by the exception. In other words, the exceeding of private defence by the accused should be done unintentionally. Only then can the accused avail of the exception provided under this clause.

ONKARNATH SINGH v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH (1974 AIR)
In this case, the deceased party has initially attempted to attack the accused party. There was an incident of grappling between the parties. When the deceased party was fleeing, the accused party made a murderous assault. It was held that in this case that since the murder was committed when the deceased were fleeing, the right of private defence ended with that, since the right is co-terminus with the commencement and existence of a reasonable apprehension of danger to body or property and not after the threat has ceased to exist. 
The Supreme Court held that the accused were guilty of vindictive and maliciously excessive act. The force used was out of all proportion to the supposed danger, which no longer existed from the deceased party. Under the circumstances, it was held that the accused were neither entitled to a right of private defence, not to the benefit of Exception 2 to section 300 IPC. 

Keeping in view the judgement cited above and the facts of the present case, it can stated that the killing of deceased by the appellant cannot be considered as an act of private defence because it was time when the deceased was sleeping peacefully and appellant approached him with an iron rod and started hitting him on the head directly and vital body parts, it clearly shows her ill-will to kill the deceased and not any act of self-defence.

KATTU SURENDRA v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH (2008 AIR)
The SC ruled in this case that death caused by a person after his right to private defence ceases to exist falls outside the ambit of the exception. 

Therefore, in the present case, when the deceased went to sleep the right of private defence ceases to exist for the appellant, therefore the act of the appellant causing death of the deceased falls outside the ambit of Exception 2 to section 300 IPC. 

RAJ SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA (2015 AIR)
The SC in this case has beautifully articulated the manner of judicial determination of claim of the accused that he has caused homicide by exceeding his lawful right of private defence. It observed: 

Absence of good faith in the exercise of the right of private defence, premeditation for the exercise of such right and acts done with the intention of causing more than harm than is necessary for the purpose of such defence would deny to the offender the benefit of Exception 2 to section 300. 

Considering the present case and judgement above, it can be stated that the appellant had sufficient time for gaining self-control and the act of causing death of the deceased in the morning after the time gap of 4-5 hours when he was sleeping. So, it is clear that the actions of the appellant were premeditated and there was a clear intention of killing the deceased rather than acting in self-defence.


SINGH & ORS v. STATE OF HARYANA (CRM 2022)
 In this case, the SC observed that the exception of good faith is a must before the accused claims benefit of the Exception 2 to section 300. While acting in good faith, if the accused has exceeded the right of self-defence and caused death of a person without pre-meditation and further he had no intention to causing more than was necessary for the purpose of the defence although in fact more harm was caused, the benefit of Exception 2 to section 300 may be available if the accused was not the aggressor. 

In the present case, the appellant had not acted in good faith which can be understand from the actions of appellant to hit and inflict injuries to the deceased on his head first and then vital body parts which shows that the appellant had full intention to kill the deceased and not only hurt him. The right of private defence taken by the appellant also cannot be supported as the act done by her was during the sleeping of deceased. Therefore, while sleeping of the deceased how the appellant can claim the right of self-defence here and also the deceased had never cause any kind of hurt to his child. So, the appellant is wrong in taking the right to selfdefence of her and her child. 


ISSUE IV: WHETHER THE ONGOING ABUSE, TRAUMA, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL STRESS IMPAIR THE APPELLANT’S JUDGEMENT TO THE EXTENT THAT IT NEGATED INTENT TO KILL?

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India that there was a gap between the last incident of violence and the fatal act, that the appellant had time to cool off and consider her actions. While the appellant experienced domestic violence, it does not legally justify the act of murder. The law must maintain a standard against taking the law into one’s own hands.

R v. AHLUWALIA (1992)
In this case, the Court stated that women who have been subjected frequently over a period to violent treatment may react to the final act or words by what he calls a “slow-burn” reaction rather than by an immediate loss of self-control. We accept that the subjective element in the defence of provocation would not as a matter of law be negative simply because of the delayed reaction in such cases, provided that there was at the time of the killing a “sudden and temporary loss of self-control” caused by the alleged provocation. However, the longer the delay and the stronger the evidence of deliberation on the part of the defendant, the more likely it will be that the prosecution will negative provocation.

So, it can be pointed out from the above judgement cited that when there is time gap between the provocation and killing; the longer the delay, there are more chances to negate the provocation. As per in the present case, there are almost 4-5 hours time lapse between the provocation and killing of the deceased. The time period of 4-5 hours can be considered as sufficient to re-gain self-control and effect of provocation in such time remains less.

SUSTAINED PROVOCATION 

The concept of provocation works very differently in cases of battery as it is a long-term and continuous process, and it is very difficult to analyse a specific trigger point that resulted in the commission of the offence. This is a case of sustained provocation. That is why these cases cannot be measured strictly by the objectivity test, as it goes against the principle of equity, natural justice, and good conscience.

‘Sustained Provocation Principle’ doesn’t go away with the requirement of immediate or the final provocative act, words or gesture, the Court noted that cumulative or sustained provocation test was immediately preceded and precipitated by some sort of provocative conduct, which would satisfy the requirement of sudden or immediate provocation. 

This defence would not be available if there is evidence of reflection or planning as they mirror exercise of calculation and premeditation, it added.

K.M. NANAVATI v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA (1962 AIR 605)
The SC relied on a series of notable precedents to draw the inference and held that the mental background created by the previous act(s) of the deceased may be taken into consideration in ascertaining whether the subsequent act caused sudden and grave provocation for committing the offence. 

“It referred to wherein the conditions which have to be satisfied to invoke the exception were defined. It was also held in the judgement that for determining whether or not the provocation had temporarily deprived the offender from the power of self-control, the test to be applied is that of a reasonable man and not that of an unusually excitable and pugnacious individual. Further, it must be considered whether there was sufficient interval and time to allow the passion to cool.” 

In the present case, the appellant had acted after a sufficient time interval and there is enough time available for her passion to cool down; which does not fall under the criteria provided the above cited judgement; therefore, the appellant is not right to claim the defence of sustained provocation in which she had been deprived from the power of self-control.

BUDDHI SINGH v. STATE OF H.P. (2012)
The SC observed that in the test for application of Exception 1 to Section 300 IPC, the primary obligation of the court is to examine the circumstances from the point of view of a person of reasonable prudence. 

“The idea behind this exception is to exclude the acts of violence which are premeditated, and not to deny consideration of circumstances such as prior animosity between the deceased and the accused, arising as a result of incidents in the past and subsequently resulting in sudden and grave provocation.” 

Taking in consideration the above cited judgement of the SC, it can be stated that in the present case, there was not any denial of animosity, instances of domestic violence and abuse by the deceased; but the final act of the appellant was clearly shown as premeditated which excluded her from the purview to fall under Exception 1 to Section 300 IPC.

BHURA RAM & ORS. v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ANR. (AIR 2008)
The SC reaffirmed in this case that another aspect of the mental state of the accused is the lack of preparation on their part. The provocation must come unexpectedly; hence, the provision that the provocation must not be sought by the accused and must not be expected in any manner. 

In the present case, the appellant after the cooling period took an iron rod and hit the deceased on his head firstly and after that on his vital body parts which resulted in on-the spot death of the deceased; clearly shows that the provocation did not come unexpectedly and the appellant had prepared on her part for such act.


PRAYER


WHEREFORE, in light of the facts presented, issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, the Counsel on Behalf of the Respondent humbly pay before the Hon’ble Court that it may be pleased to adjudge and declare: 

1. Uphold the conviction of the appellant. 
2. Liable for the murder of the deceased. 
                                                        And/Or 
Pass any other Order, Direction, or Relief that it may deem fit in the best interests of Justice, Fairness, Equity and Good Conscience. 

FOR THIS ACT OF KINDNESS, THE RESPONDENT SHALL DUTY BOUND FOREVER PRAY. 

All of which is respectfully submitted. 

                                                                                                                                                               Sd/-
                                                                                                                      On Behalf Of The Respondent

Friday, August 15, 2025

A Brief Study: The Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009


Introduction

Historically, access to education in India was largely restricted to the privileged — primarily Brahmins and elite classes, while marginalized communities were excluded. Post-independence, India embraced the vision of inclusive education through its Constitution, which recognizes education as a tool for empowerment and social justice.

In 2002, through the 86th Constitutional Amendment, Article 21-A was inserted, making education a Fundamental Right for children aged 6 to 14 years. To give effect to this constitutional mandate, the Parliament enacted the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (commonly known as the RTE Act), which came into force on 1st April 2010.

Objective of the RTE Act

The Act aims to:

  • Ensure free and compulsory elementary education for every child aged 6 to 14 years.
  • Guarantee education of equitable quality without discrimination.
  • Set standards for infrastructure, teacher qualifications, curriculum, and school governance.
  • Promote inclusive education, particularly for disadvantaged and weaker sections of society.
Key Provisions of the Act

1. Scope and Definitions (Sections 1–2)

  • Applicable across India (initially excluding Jammu & Kashmir).
  • Not applicable to religious institutions like Madrasas or Vedic Pathshalas.
  • Defines crucial terms including:
    • Child: 6 to 14 years
    • Disadvantaged groups: SCs/STs, children with disabilities, etc.
    • Weaker sections: Based on annual income as notified by the government
    • Elementary education: Classes 1 to 8

2. Right to Education (Sections 3–5)

  • Every child has the right to free education without any fees or charges.
  • Children not enrolled at the right age must be admitted to an age-appropriate class, with special training if required.
  • Transfer certificates must be issued promptly if a child moves between schools; delays are punishable.

3. Responsibilities of the Government and Local Authorities (Sections 6–9)

  • Governments must:
    • Establish neighborhood schools within specified areas.
    • Ensure non-discrimination, especially for disadvantaged children.
    • Provide adequate infrastructure, learning materials, and trained teachers.
  • Local authorities must:
    • Maintain records of children up to age 14.
    • Monitor attendance and academic progress.
    • Plan and maintain educational infrastructure.

4. Duty of Parents and Pre-School Provisions (Sections 10–11)

  • Parents are legally responsible for enrolling their children in a neighborhood school.
  • Governments are encouraged to provide free early childhood education (pre-schooling) for children up to age 6.

5. School Obligations (Section 12)

  • All recognized private schools must:
    • Reserve at least 25% of seats in Class I for children from disadvantaged and weaker sections.
    • Provide education free of cost to those children.
    • Claim reimbursement from the government as per the prescribed formula.
  • No reimbursement is allowed if schools already received public land or subsidies.

6. Prohibited Practices (Sections 13–17)

  • Capitation fees and screening procedures at admission are strictly prohibited.
    • Penalties: Up to 10 times of the fee charged or ₹50,000 per day of continuing offences.
  • Corporal punishment and mental harassment are banned.
  • No child can be expelled or held back until completion of elementary education.

7. Recognition and Standards for Schools (Sections 18–20)

  • Private unaided schools must obtain recognition from the appropriate authority.
  • All schools must conform to minimum norms and standards (as per the Schedule).
  • Non-compliance may result in withdrawal of recognition and financial penalties.

8. School Management and Development (Sections 21–22)

  • Every school (except minority institutions) must form a School Management Committee (SMC):
    • Composed of 75% parents/guardians, with 50% women representation.
    • Must include parents from disadvantaged and weaker sections.
    • SMC functions include - 
    1. Monitoring school functioning
    2. Preparing the School Development Plan
    3. Supervising utilization of government grants

9. Teachers and Curriculum (Sections 23–30)

  • Teachers must meet minimum qualifications prescribed by the Central Government.
  • No teacher can:
    • Be used for non-educational duties (except elections, census, disaster relief)
    • Engage in private tuition
  • Curriculum must ensure:
    • Child-centric, activity-based learning
    • Use of mother tongue as far as possible
    • Development of cognitive, physical, and emotional abilities
    • Continuous and comprehensive evaluation
    • Board exams are not required at the elementary level.

10. Monitoring, Grievance Redressal, and Advisory Bodies (Sections 31–34)

  • The National and State Commissions for Protection of Child Rights (NCPCR/SCPCR) are empowered to:
    • Monitor implementation
    • Investigate complaints
    • Recommend measures for effective enforcement
  • Local authorities must resolve complaints within 3 months, with an appeal to the SCPCR or prescribed authority.

11. Central and State Advisory Councils (Sections 33–34)

  • Advisory Councils (max 15 members) must be constituted at the national and state levels.
  • Functions: Advise governments on policy and implementation of the Act.

12. Rule-Making Powers and Protection Clauses (Sections 35–39)

  • The Central and State Governments may issue rules and guidelines to implement the Act.
  • Good faith actions under the Act are protected from legal action.
  • Central Government has powers to resolve implementation difficulties.

Judicial Precedents and Interpretation

Key Case Law:

   Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka 1992 (Capitation fee case)
  1.  Capitation fee in private schools were challenged. 
  2. Supreme Court held that Right to Education is part of Article 21.
  3. Charging high fees violate Article 14 (equality).
  4. Education should not depend on wealth.
  5.  State has a duty to provide education to all.
   Unni Krishnan, J.P. v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1993)
  1. Affirmed Right to Education as part of Article 21 (Right to Life).
  2. Education is a fundamental right up to the age of 14.
  3. Beyond age 14, it is subject to the State’s economic capacity.
  4. Held capitation fees and discriminatory practices to be violative of Article 14.

Conclusion

The Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 is a milestone in India’s journey towards universal and inclusive education. It legally mandates:

  • Equity and access in school admissions
  • Quality standards in infrastructure and curriculum
  • Transparency and accountability in school functioning

The Act recognizes that education is not a privilege, but a constitutional right, and lays the foundation for a more just, informed, and empowered society.

Resources -

https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/13682/1/rte_act_2009.pdf

https://blog.ipleaders.in/rte-act-right-to-education-act-2009/

https://dsel.education.gov.in/rte

https://righttoeducation.in/know-your-rte/about


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